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ABSTRACT: 
 
This thesis investigates the existence of the green bond premium and its determinants through 
an analysis of 44 corporate green bonds and their matched non-green bonds listed on the Bloom-
berg Terminal over the period of 01/01/2016 – 28/02/2020.  A Matching method is used to 
match green bonds with comparable conventional bonds, followed by a two-stage regression 
procedure.  
 
In the first stage, the study examines the presence of the green bond premium. A panel regres-
sion with fixed effects is performed to disentangle yield differential between green bonds and 
matched conventional peers into two main components: the liquidity difference measured by 
the difference in the bid-ask spread and the green bond premium. Empirical results indicate that 
green bonds are traded at lower -0.45 basis points yield compared to their conventional peers, 
confirming the presence of the green bond premium in the secondary corporate bond market. 
This result supports the argument that investors are willing to accept a lower return to acquire 
green bonds over their non-green counterparts. The second stage of the analysis aims to identify 
the factors influencing the green bond premium. To reach that goal, cross-sectional regressions 
are run for the estimated bond-specific green premium, with bond characteristics being the ex-
planatory variables. The study discovers that the principal amount at issuance of green bonds 
negatively impacts the green bond premium. Meanwhile, the thesis could not find any significant 
influence of external reviews on the green bond premium.  
 
The empirical outcomes signal the high market demand for corporate green bonds. For the bond 
investors, benefits from enhanced transparency and engagement with the green bond issuers 
would outweigh the extra cost of acquiring green bonds instead of ordinary bonds. Building on 
this research, future studies could examine the green bond premium when the market matures 
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According to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (2020), the past five 
years (2015 – 2019) were the warmest in the record since 1880. The steady rising 
temperatures, along with extreme natural disasters in many places around the world, 
indicate that global warming is now an irreversible threat to the worldwide economy. In 
the purpose of mitigating the climate change risk, it is estimated that around $90 trillion 
would be needed for facilitating the transition into a low-carbon and more sustainable 
economy by 2030 (The Global Commission on the Economy and Climate, 2018). That 
trend has transformed the financial markets as well. In the 21st Conference of the Parties 
to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate (COP21) 2015, the Paris 
Agreement was adopted, emphasizing that the global goal is to limit the rise of the 
temperature “well below 2 degrees Celsius”. In addition to that, the financial market 
should follow a direction towards a climate-resilient economy (United Nations, 2015).  
 
During the past decade, new innovative investing solutions have been introduced, 
aiming at financing the projects that create positive environmental impacts. In this 
context, green bond, which is defined as “fixed income, liquid financial instruments that 
are used to raise funds dedicated to climate mitigation, adaptation, and other 
environment-friendly projects” (World Bank, 2017), has become increasingly popular in 
the bond market. Since the first issuance of the Climate Awareness Bond by the 
European Investment Bank (EIB) in 2007, the green bond market has experienced 
exponential growth in the number of deals and issued amounts. Remarkably, after the 
adoption of the Paris Agreement 2015, the green bond issuance has been growing by 
more than 80% in 2016 and 2017. In 2019, the green bond market continued to mark a 
new global record with a total amount of $257.7 billion green bond issuance, surging by 
51% from $170.6 billion in 2018 (CBI, 2020).  
 
Figure 1 illustrates the evolution of green bond issuance over the period 2013 – 2019. 
Mirroring the global trend, new green bond issuance in Europe reached $116.7 billion in 
2019, up by 74% from 2018 and accounted for 45% of worldwide issuance. Asia-Pacific 
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remained the second largest contributor to the market, accounting for a fourth of the 
global figure with a year-on-year increase in new green bond issuance of 29%. 
Meanwhile, the North American region witnessed robust growth in 2019 (46%), 
comprising 23% of the global volume. 
 
 
Figure 1. Green bond issuance by region 2013 – 2019 (CBI, 2020) 
 
In the 2018 Green Bond Market Summary, CBI (2019) highlights that while there is a 
slowdown in the municipal and governmental green bond sector, the market for 
corporate green bonds is substantially expanding. Notably, this potential market has just 
existed since 2013, with the first issuance of EDF’s green bonds to financing 13 
renewable energy projects in France and North America (Electricite De France, 2019). As 
presented in Figure 2, in 2019, the corporate sector (including financial and non-financial 
entities) remained a significant player with a total of $114.5 billion green bond issuance, 







Figure 2. Green bonds issuance by issuer type 2014 – 2019 (CBI, 2020) 
 
Despite the ongoing significance of the topic, there is little evidence of the benefits of 
corporate green bonds and their implications for investors and corporate issuers. Corpo-
rate green bond is a new financial instrument and the market for this type of bond is 
relatively small in comparison to the entire bond market. Available literature mainly ex-
amines the financial performance and the valuation of municipal and supranational 
bonds. Meanwhile, it is argued that these markets are not comparable due to discrep-
ancies in bond specifications (Flammer, 2018). Therefore, this thesis aims to investigate 
the performance of corporate green bonds in terms of yield. 
 
 
1.1 Purpose of the study 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the yield differential between green bonds and 
comparable ordinary ones in the secondary corporate bond market. More precisely, this 
translates into answering the two following questions: ‘Is there a green bond premium?’ 




In an attempt to estimate the difference in yield between each corporate green bond 
and its corresponding conventional bond, the Matching method is applied in this study. 
This approach is consistent with previous academic research on examining the yield 
differentials. Through a panel regression with fixed effects of daily yield spreads between 
two types of bonds after controlling for liquidity difference, the green premium is 
addressed as an unobserved bond-specific fixed effect in this model (Zerbib, 2019). Next, 
the determinants of this green premium are identified by an OLS cross-sectional 
regression model.  
 
This thesis aims to examine a sample of corporate green bonds listed on the Bloomberg 
Terminal as of December 31, 2019. Each green bond belongs to the list is matched with 
conventional bonds that are issued by the same issuer and exhibit the nearest maturity 
and the same other characteristics. Further information about the uses and reporting of 





Firstly, the study attempts to investigate the existence of the green bond premium. The 
Economic Theories of Social Norms suggests that investors may accept a financial cost 
to reduce reputational or ethical risks from disobeying social norms (Elster, 1989). This 
argument implies that investors may promote pro-environmental preferences by 
accepting lower returns on their investment portfolios. Additionally, Fama and French 
(2007) conclude that the taste for assets could influence investment decisions. 
Furthermore, a majority of existing research on green bond premium proves that green 
bonds have lower yields than their conventional counterparts. Since green bonds are 
potentially perceived as less risky, investors are willing to expect a lower yield when 
investing in green bonds over conventional bonds. Due to the inverse relationship 
between bond yield and price, it means that green bonds are overpriced in comparison 




H1: Green bonds are traded with lower yields in comparison to ordinary bonds 
 
Secondly, similar to prior research, this thesis explores the factors influencing the green 
bond premium. Previous empirical studies suggest that the bond rating, the issue 
amount and the type of issuer are vital drivers of the green bond premium. For instance, 
Zerbib (2019) documents that AA- and A-rated green bonds exhibit a higher premium 
compared to other green bonds. Karpf and Mandel (2017) show that green bonds have 
a higher premium if the principal amount at issuance increases. Furthermore, Febi et al. 
(2018) discover that maturity also has a significant effect on the green bond premium. 
In addition to that, Bachelet et al. (2019) and Li et al. (2019) find that the issuer type and 
the “green” verification by external parties of green bonds also impact its pricing. 
Therefore, the following hypothesis is formed: 
 
H2: The characteristics of a green bond affect its green premium 
 
 
1.3 Structure of the study 
The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 1 presents a brief introduction to the 
research topic and hypotheses. Chapter 2 encompasses necessary information about the 
corporate green bond market and provides the readers with common arguments over 
the concept of Green Bond. Chapter 3 reviews the previous literature, focusing on the 
relation between the corporate environmental performance and bond yield, whereby 
the topic of Green Bond Pricing is thoroughly discussed. 
 
In chapter 4, a description of the dataset and the methodology used in the thesis is ex-
plained. Precisely, this part describes the Matching method applied for processing data 
and the empirical models for hypotheses testing. Chapter 5 summarizes the main results 
from the empirical tests and compares them with existing research, whereby the 
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research questions are answered. Finally, the managerial implications, the main limita-




2 Corporate green bond 
A bond is a fixed-income security that allows the issuer to borrow money from bond-
holders in exchange for contractual streams of payment over a specified period. The is-
suers of bonds could be the state and local governments, government-related entities, 
and corporations (Fabozzi, 2010). Unlike government bonds, corporate bonds are not 
risk-free even though they generally generate promised flows of income for bondholders. 
It is because several types of risk associated with the financial situation of issuing firms 
could affect the actual coupon and principal payments on these bonds (Bodie et al., 
2014). Investors, therefore, require higher yields to compensate for higher levels of risk 
they take when investing in corporate bonds. 
 
In principle, the present value of a bond consists of the annual coupon payments and 
the final principal discounted by a pre-determined discount rate. Thus, the price of a 
bond can be computed as follow (Fabozzi, 2010): 
 
𝑃0 = ∑ 𝐶𝑡(1 + 𝑟)𝑡 + 𝐹𝑉(1 + 𝑟)𝑛 𝑛𝑡=1  
 
where:  𝑃0 = bond price 
  𝐶𝑡 = coupon payment 
  𝐹𝑉 = face value or par value 
  𝑟 = interest rate or (required) yield of investors 
  𝑛 = number of coupon payments 
  𝑡 = time period when the payment is received 
 
When discussing bond valuation, another central concept is yield which implies the ac-
tual return that investors earn from investing in a bond. In practice, there are several 
metrics of bond yields. The most commonly used measure is Yield To Maturity (YTM). It 
is defined as the interest rate that makes the present value of the future cash flows from 
14 
 
a bond equal to its current market price, assuming that the bond is held to maturity. 
Accordingly, YTM could be calculated by using the above equation with a given bond 
price. In this case, the most critical factors of a bond are taken into account (current 
market price, coupon payment, face value, time to maturity), thereby making it easier 
to compare bonds with different features (Fabozzi, 2010). 
 
A remarkable feature of a bond is the inverse relationship between bond price and yield. 
When the required yield of a bond decreases, the present value of the cash flows from 
it is higher, making its price goes up. Also, the bond price goes down when its required 
yield increases (Fabozzi, 2010). Theoretically speaking, when the expected yield of a 
bond is higher than the coupon rate, the bond must be sold at a lower price than its face 
value. Otherwise, rational investors are not willing to invest in an asset that generates a 
lower return than their expectations. In this case, the bond is sold at a discount. On the 
contrary, when the required yield of a bond falls below its coupon rate, the bond be-
comes an attractive asset to invest. The bond price, therefore, rises above its par value. 
In other words, the bond is sold at a premium (Fabozzi, 2010). 
 
In general, a green bond is a bond whose proceeds are used to fund projects that are 
meant to deliver environmental or climate-related benefits (G20 Green Finance Study 
Group, 2016). Therefore, green bonds can be a financing source for a wide variety of 
industries. Figure 3 provides information on the allocation of the proceeds from issuing 
green bonds throughout 2017 – 2019. It could be observed that the Energy and Buildings 
are the most funded sectors, which account for approximately 60% of the funds from 
green bond issuance (CBI, 2020). The Transport sector follows with around 20% market 
share. Those figures imply the global efforts to primarily develop low-carbon buildings, 
environmental-friendly transportation system and renewable energies. The remaining 
categories, including Waste, Water, Land Use, Industry, Information and Communication 
Technologies (ICT) and Adaptation and Resilience (Unalloc. A&R), account for roughly 20% 










2.1 The Green Bond Principles 
Since the green bond is a recent phenomenon, there are still no standardized regulations 
for this type of securities. In that context, the Green Bond Principles (GBP), the most 
widely accepted voluntary guidelines, were developed by the International Capital Mar-
ket Association in 2014. The primary objectives of the GBP are to inform issuers with 
major concerns involved when issuing credible green bonds and provide investors with 
the necessary information that needs to be considered when evaluating a green bond 
investment. In addition to that, the GBP also lays a foundation for the standardization of 
the green bond regulations. 
 
The GBP recommends a clear process and disclosure for issuers and highlights the im-
portance of transparency, accuracy and integrity in reporting about green bond issuance 
and use of proceeds. In essence, four core pillars of the GBP are Use of proceeds, Process 
of Project Evaluation and Selection, Management of Proceeds and Reporting 




Use of proceeds 
 
The use of proceeds for environmental projects is a typical trait of a green bond. Thus, 
all the essential information about it should be clearly stated in the legal documentation 
of the green bond. Specifically, the allocation of the proceeds, environmental benefits 
and the feasibility of the projects should be measured and communicated with the in-
vestors. Furthermore, the uses of proceeds which are eligible for green bonds are de-
fined and categorized into the following non-exhaustive groups (International Capital 
Market Association, 2018): 
- Renewable energy; 
- Energy efficiency; 
- Pollution prevention and control; 
- Sustainable management of land and living natural resources; 
- Biodiversity conservation; 
- Clean transportation; 
- Sustainable water and wastewater management; 
- Climate change adaptation; 
- Eco-efficient and/or circular economy products, technologies, processes; 
- Green buildings. 
 
Process of Project Evaluation and Selection 
 
The GBP suggests the green bond issuers to thoroughly communicate about the environ-
mental objectives of the green projects and identify how they fit within the eligible cat-
egories of green projects described above. The benefits of green projects should also be 
clearly stated and quantified if possible (International Capital Market Association, 2018).  
 




It is advised that the proceeds from green bonds should be periodically adjusted to 
match the allocation of funds to the eligible green projects. It means that issuers should 
keep track of the use of the allocated amounts to ensure that capital raised from green 
bonds is appropriately spent. Moreover, the investors should also be informed about the 





Information about the green projects, the allocated amount of proceeds and the ex-
pected environmental impacts should be communicated to the investors on a timely ba-
sis. Besides, the GBP recommends the issuers to use quantitative metrics to monitor the 
performance and the feasibility of the green projects. A description of those methods, 
along with the underlying assumptions and key performance indicators, should also be 
included in the regular reporting (International Capital Market Association, 2018). 
 
In addition to the preceding considerations, the GBP also recommends the green bond 
issuers to obtain external reviews as supplemental evidence for the transparency, integ-
rity and accuracy of their green bond issuance. The importance and types of independ-
ent reviews will be discussed further in this chapter.  
 
 
2.2 Advantages and disadvantages of green bond issuance 
From the issuer’s standpoint, a green bond could be seen as evidence of their sustaina-
bility strategy. Through issuing green bonds, firms can communicate with lenders about 
the integration of ESG factors into their business operations, thereby gaining their repu-
tation as an environmentally-responsible establishment. Furthermore, issuing green 
bonds could help firms diversify the investor base by attracting more institutional and 
individual investors who are interested in environmental-related securities (Shishlov et 




Through a survey of 86 treasurers from numerous green bond issuing entities, CBI (2020) 
reveals that 91% of the respondents concurred that green bond issuance accelerates 
more engagement with the investors via mutual dialogues about the issuance and the 
reporting process of green bonds. Also, 98% of the respondents supposed that new in-
vestors had been attracted thanks to the issuance of green bonds. Another beneficial 
effect of green bond issuance is the possibility to raise awareness about green finance 
within the issuing institutions. Also, the green bond issuing and tracking process could 
improve the internal synergies between finance and sustainability departments in tack-
ling ESG issues (Shishlov et al., 2016).  
 
Conversely, one primary concern of the green bond’s issuing entities is the upfront and 
ongoing costs for labeling, tracking and reporting activities related to the green bond 
issuance. In fact, the issuance of green bonds requires extra charges for establishing a 
framework, commissioning external assurance about the eligibility of bonds and other 
costs for the management and reporting of the use of proceeds. Another challenge faced 
by the green bond issuers is the reputational and legal risk when they cannot justify the 
integrity of green bonds (Shishlov et al., 2016). In this case, the green bond issuance 
could be potentially alleged as “greenwashing”, leading to costly legal proceedings. For 
instance, in 2017, Walmart had to pay $1 million to resolve the greenwashing claims that 
it sold plastic products that had been wrongly labeled as “biodegradable” or “composta-
ble” (Hardcastle, 2017). 
 
From the lender’s perspective, additional information on the use of proceeds from green 
bonds and enhanced transparency created through stricter reporting could be valuable 
when appraising the investment strategies and related risks without incurring extra 
transaction costs. Noticeably, SRI funds and individual investors adopt strict screening 
standards that allow them to invest merely in firms that are considered to be socially or 
environmentally responsible. Firms that cannot pass those criteria could help alleviate 
this problem by issuing green bonds, indicating that the money raised from that is used 
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to fund environmental-related activities. As a result, by investing in such green bonds, 
SRI funds could further diversify their portfolio while maintaining strict screening criteria 
(Shishlov et al., 2016).  
 
However, similar to the issuing institutions, the concern over the integrity of green bonds 
remains the greatest problem since the green bond market is self-regulatory. The lack of 
consensus on the standards of green bonds and information disclosures is likely to create 
misunderstanding among market actors, especially when the market is growing in terms 
of size and scope (Shishlov et al., 2016). If investors do not have sufficient information 
about the environmental profile of the green bond issuer, they are not able to assess the 
feasibility of the green projects as well as their associated risks (G20 Green Finance Study 
Group, 2016). As a result, green bonds could be mispriced by the market.  
 
To conclude, there are several challenges concerning the issuance and investment of 
green bonds. It is due to the recent emergence of the green bond with the lack of stand-
ardized regulations. Nevertheless, in light of the growing concern about green finance, 
it appears that the benefits outweigh the costs, which could justify the expansion of the 
green bond market. 
 
 
2.3 External reviews 
As stated earlier, the lack of standard regulations for green bonds results in the so-called 
“greenwashing” concern. According to KPMG (2015), a green bond is considered as a 
mean of “greenwashing” when: 
- Proceeds from green bonds are used to fund projects that do not aim to generate pos-
itive environmental or climate-related impacts; 
- Principal business activities of the issuers are unsustainable and create detrimental ef-
fects on the ecosystem; 
- Proceeds are not appropriately managed to ensure that they are used to fund the in-
tended green projects; 
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- Issuers are not able to clarify the objectives as well as the actual environmental impacts 
of green projects. 
 
Therefore, to mitigate the risk of “greenwashing” and enhance the integrity of the green 
bond market, the GBP recommends green bond issuers to obtain an external review for 
their green bond issuance. In addition, the GBP also outlines the major criteria that most 
of the certification of external review schemes follow. Table 1 describes various types of 
external review green bond issuance. 
 
Table 1. Types of external review of green bonds (Shishlov et al., 2018), (CBI, 2015) 






Providing advice to create the corporate green 
bond framework for the green bond issuers, or 
offering a ‘second-opinion’ about the adher-
ence to the GBP of the green bond issuers. The 
“greenness” of the eligible projects or assets 






Certifying that the green bond and its associ-
ated framework adhere to the prevailing 




Verification Giving assurance about the alignment of green 
bond or the associated framework with inter-




Rating Offering a rating scale to enable the compari-
son among different categories of bonds in 
terms of the level of sustainability. 






Notwithstanding the incurrence of additional costs, the acquisition of an external review 
brings various benefits to the green bond issuers and investors. The first advantage of 
the external review is that it signals the integrity of the green bond issuance and man-
agement of proceeds, thereby, allowing the green bond issuing entities to attract a more 
diverse investor base (CBI, 2020). In addition to that, it offers the debt providers with an 
assurance that the proceeds from green bonds are used and managed properly in com-
pliance with the commonly adopted guidelines. For that reason, the issuers of green 
bonds could reduce the risk of being perceived as “greenwashing”. Finally, although ex-
ternal reviews do not provide assurance about the credit risks or the expected returns 
of green bonds, it enables investors to quickly and easily find a credible green bond 






3 Literature review 
Although the green bond topic is a new area of research, its examination fits into prior 
literature on Socially Responsible Investing (SRI). The field of SRI is concerned with the 
integration of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) factors into the traditional 
investment process. Prior research on the area of CSR recognizes considerable financial 
benefits originating from good CSR practices. In particular, superior Corporate Social 
Performance (CSP) could have a positive influence on a firm’s cost of capital from various 
perspectives. Renneboog et al. (2008) state that SRI investors are willing to pay a 
premium for the appreciation of social or ethical values of their investments. Also, SRI 
funds are expected to underperform conventional funds (Riedl & Smeets, 2017). 
Accordingly, the main questions arising from this new investment approach are: To what 
extent do firms and investors benefit from SRI practices? And what is the interest of 
investors to invest in underperforming assets here?  
 
A large number of academic studies address the above concerns by investigating the 
effects of CSP on the cost of equity. However, the empirical results are mixed. While 
Statman and Glushkov (2009) find no significant difference in returns between socially 
responsible portfolios and their ordinary counterparts, Brammer et al. (2006) find a 
negative impact of CSP on stock prices. Interestingly, Krüger (2015) documents that the 
market reacts negatively to both positive and negative news about firms’ CSP even 
though adverse investor reaction to good CSP announcement is much weaker. The 
author further explains that positive news about CSP implies that firms have had some 
issues with CSR in the past. Conversely, numerous researchers propose that CSP 
positively impacts the cost of equity (Konar & Cohen, 2001; Kempf & Osthoff, 2007; 
Ghoul et al., 2011). 
 
Another strand of literature studies investor preferences through the performance of 
“sin” stocks and bonds. By extensive analysis of the stock market for 1962 – 2006, Hong 
and Kacperczyk (2009) provide evidence that stocks from sinful industries (tobacco, 
alcohol, gaming) expose to higher risks, hence, resulting in higher expected returns. 
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Ghoul et al. (2011) reach a similar conclusion when observing a sample of 12,915 U.S. 
firms from 1992 to 2005. In contrast, Fabozzi et al. (2019) analyze a sample of 546 unique 
“sin” bonds and 9,118 ordinary bonds and conclude that “sin” bonds are overvalued. The 
possible explanation for this result is that the pressure of transparency is more influential 
in the equity market than in the debt market. Thus, bondholders of “sin” bonds tend to 
pay a premium to invest in firms that are expected to generate higher returns (Fabozzi 
et al., 2019). 
 
Recent academic works have attempted to relate CSP to the cost of debt. According to 
Ge and Liu (2015), CSP is positively correlated with corporate bond ratings and superior 
CSP allows firms to issue bonds with lower spreads. Oikonomou et al. (2014) reach the 
same conclusion when examining the U.S. corporate debt market. Likewise, a study 
conducted by Ghouma et al. (2018) reveals that enhanced corporate governance enables 
Canadian firms to decrease bond yield spreads. From the bank lending perspective, Goss 
and Roberts (2011) observe a sample of 3,996 loans to U.S. firms to investigate the 
impact of CSR on bank loan interest rates. The findings suggest that CSR strength does 
not reduce the cost of borrowing. Nevertheless, firms that have CSR problems are 
charged with higher interest rates from banks. La Rosa et al. (2018) report a similar 
finding when investigating listed European firms from 2005 to 2012. Moreover, the 
authors document that CSP is positively associated with debt rating and lenders 
appreciate companies with strong CSP.  
 
In contrast to the studies mentioned above, Menz (2010) researches the European 
corporate bond market and finds that there is a weak positive linkage between CSP and 
bond spreads. Similarly, through an analysis of 1,641 observations over a period from 
2005 to 2009, Magnanelli and Izzo (2017) conclude that CSP increases the cost of debt. 
The authors argue that CSR ratings may not add more values to investors as credit ratings 
already include some of the environmental, social and governance factors. Moreover, 
investors may not take CSR considerations into account when making investment 
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decisions because they do not see an apparently positive impact of CSR practices on the 
risk-return characteristics of their investments. 
 
Although no consensus has been achieved with regard to the impact of CSP on the firm’s 
financing, most of the available literature suggests that CSP positively influences firms’ 
cost of debt. In particular, in the wake of sustainability finance, environmental practices 
play a crucial role in sustainable business operations. Besides, the green bond is consid-
ered a favorable financial instrument that offers several important benefits for corpo-
rates and investors. For that reason, the published research relating to environmental 
considerations and green bond performance will be discussed further in the following 
parts of this chapter. The first section explores the relationship between corporate envi-
ronmental performance and the cost of debt. In the second section, essential empirical 
studies on the performance of green bonds are analyzed. 
 
 
3.1 Environmental performance and cost of debt 
The linkage between environmental management and the firm’s financing has been 
studied extensively. In the earlier studies on this area, it is indicated that good 
environmental management lowers the cost of debt. Sharfman and Fernando (2008), 
Schneider (2011), Bauer and Hann (2014) suggest that bond yield is negatively 
associated with environmental performance. Nevertheless, this relationship fades as 
bond rating improves (Schneider, 2011). On the contrary, Chava (2014) documents that 
good environmental practices do not reduce the cost of capital. Meanwhile, firms with 
environmental issues have significantly higher costs of debt (Chava, 2014). This claim is 
consistent with Bauer and Hann (2014) who argue that firms that create environmental 
problems are more likely to default on their debts due to a higher possibility to suffer 
from reputational losses, legal and regulatory risks. In contrast, companies that actively 
generate environmental benefits through their products, services and business 
operations could mitigate the above-mentioned risks and improve profitability. As a 




Another stream of literature on the relationship between environmental considerations 
and the cost of debt investigates bank lending behavior. For instance, by studying bank 
loan spreads of 2,679 unique firms from 1992 to 2007, Chava (2014) reveals that banks 
charge lower interest rates to eco-friendly firms, while companies with environmental 
problems bear relatively higher interest rates. The author explains that bank lenders 
could be potentially accountable for environmental harm caused by their borrowers. 
Another possible reason is that banks may face a reputational risk when they lend money 
to environmentally-damaging projects. Therefore, banks tend to care more about the 
environmental profile of their debtors. 
 
Regarding the impact of environmental practices on the bond ratings, while Bauer and 
Hann (2014) show a weak link between superior environmental management and higher 
credit ratings, Chabowski et al. (2019) study 310 unique firms in the U.S. from 1987 to 
2015 and claim that companies exposing to polluting activities have low bond ratings. 
One possible reason behind these outcomes is that activities to reduce detrimental 
impacts on the environment may increase firms’ financial positions, including returns on 
assets and Tobin’s Q (Bauer & Hann, 2014). Conversely, companies that have poor 
environmental performance are likely to have weak corporate governance or internal 
control. Since profitability, firm value, corporate governance practices and internal 
control are the crucial elements in the credit rating process, it is suggested that 
environmental efficiency and bond ratings are positively associated (Chabowski et al., 
2019). 
 
Taken together, despite the contradictory pieces of evidence, a majority of prior litera-
ture seems to propose that environmental strengths have a positive impact on the cost 
of debt of companies partially through enhanced credit qualities. On the other hand, as 
previously analyzed, environmental concerns pose litigation, regulatory as well as repu-




3.2 Green bond performance 
Earlier studies on green bonds focus on understanding the benefits of issuing green 
bonds. By conducting an event study, Flammer (2018) finds that the financial market 
reacts positively to the announcements on green bonds issuance. To be more specific, 
the average cumulative abnormal return (CAR) on the shares of firms that issue green 
bonds in the two-day window [-1, 0] is 0.67% and significant at 5% level. Additionally, 
she suggests that the issuance of green bonds improves firms’ profitability in the long 
run, thanks to the effectiveness of the green projects.  
 
By applying a market model with the domestic market and MSCI market indices, 
Baulkaran (2019) investigates a sample of 54 public-traded firms issuing green bonds 
worldwide and shows that the average CAR on the stocks of the issuing companies in the 
announcement day is -0.17%. However, this result is not statistically significant. The 
author proposes that there might be chances of leakage of information. Thus, the CAR 
on announcement day is insignificant. On a [-10, 10] event window, the study reports an 
average CAR of 1.48% (when using the domestic market index) and 1.42% (when using 
the MSCI market index). Likewise, Tang and Zhang (2018) claim that corporate green 
bond issuance seems to be beneficial to shareholders. More specifically, on [-10, 10] and 
[-5, 10] event window, the average CAR on the stocks of the green bond issuers is 
approximately 1%. Nevertheless, the authors find weak evidence on the market reaction 
to financial institutions issuing green bonds. 
 
Empirical studies targeting green bond performance in the primary market, where green 
bonds are issued, have been limited so far. It is mainly due to the fact that the green 
bond market is still at an early stage of development. Ehlers and Packer (2017) were 
among the first studies to examine the valuation of green bonds through the concept of 
green bond premium. According to the authors, the green bond premium exists when 
investors are willing to pay a higher price or accept a lower yield to invest in green bonds 
over conventional ones. Through a comparative analysis of yield spreads at issuance 
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between 21 green bonds and their “brown” counterparts, they report an average 
negative premium of 18 basis points (bps).  
 
Similarly, by employing six different matching approaches, Gianfrate and Peri (2019) 
examine 121 pairs of green and ordinary bonds and document a negative premium of 
18.5 bps. This finding is closely consistent with the previous article from Ehlers and 
Packer (2017). The key takeaway is that the “greenness” specification negatively impacts 
bond yield and this effect is stronger in the primary market. The article further explores 
that the cost of achieving a green label or verification from an external party for the 
“greenness” of bonds is far lower than the above-estimated premium. This finding 
implies that the financial gain achieved from issuing green bonds outweigh the extra 
costs incurring during the green labeling process.  
 
Furthermore, Baker et al. (2018) conduct an intensive analysis that considers the 
potential role of green verification. The results highlight that green bonds have lower 
after-tax yields than those of ordinary bonds (by 5.5 to 7.6 bps) and this gap is even wider 
when the “greenness” of bonds is assured by the CBI. Following the econometric model 
developed by Baker et al. (2018), Fatica et al. (2019) regress bond’s offering yield at 
issuance on the “greenness” and other bond characteristics over a sample of 266,724 
bonds from Dealogic DCM over the period 2007 – 2018. They find that only green 
supranational and non-financial green bonds are issued at a premium compared to 
normal bonds. Particularly, the negative impact of the “greenness” on the yields of 
supranational bonds is approximately four times larger than its effect on non-financial 
bonds’ yields. By contrast, the authors find no statistically significant yield gap for bonds 
issued by financial institutions. They suggest that investors prefer supranational and 
non-financial green bonds to financial ones because of higher transparency in the uses 
of proceeds in governmental and non-financial organizations. 
 
While the previously discussed research appears to agree on the existence of a negative 
green bond premium in the primary market, CBI (2018) shows mixed results when 
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investigating the yield curves of 60 new-issued green bonds from January 2016 to June 
2018. The report indicates that 31 out of 60 green bonds are traded at higher yields than 
the non-green bonds, although the magnitude of this pattern is smaller than expected. 
On the other hand, 29 out of 60 green bonds have similar or lower yields compared to 
those of conventional bonds, implying that there is little evidence about the green bond 
premium. 
 
Another line of research focuses on discovering the green bond premium in the second-
ary market where green bonds are traded after issuance. Barclays (2015) regresses the 
cost of debt measured by the option-adjusted spread (OAS) on numerous bond-specific 
and green dummy variables and reports a negative premium of 17 bps. Using a different 
approach, Zerbib (2019) matches green bonds to conventional bonds of the same issuer 
to construct a dataset of 1,065 bonds complying with the GBP. The author thereby finds 
a statistically significant but moderate premium of -2 bps. Remarkably, this premium 
varies across different market segments. For instance, the green bond premium is close 
to zero for AAA government-related bonds, while the negative effect of green label on 
green bond yield is greater for financial and low-rated bonds (with a negative premium 
of 2.5 – 2.7 bps). Although the result does not indicate any substantial discrepancy in 
pricing between green bonds and comparable ordinary bonds, the study highlights that 
institutions may have a chance to expand their bondholder base by issuing green bonds. 
 
When comparing the yield spreads of 548 U.S municipal green bonds and 667 ordinary 
bonds from 2015 to 2018, Partridge and Medda (2020) report a statistically significant 
premium of -3.7 bps. Furthermore, the researchers conduct an index benchmarking 
analysis by constructing green-labeled bond indices then comparing their performance 
with that of the S&P investment-grade municipal index over the period 2015 – 2018. The 
study finds that the green-labeled bond index outperformed the S&P investment-grade 
municipal index with a higher Compound Annual Growth Rate (2.86% versus 2.45%) and 
lower volatility (0.73% versus 1.82%). This result is in line with the prior yield analysis, 
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which implies that green bonds are traded at a premium in comparison to their conven-
tional counterparts.  
 
In contrast to the articles mentioned above, Karpf and Mandel (2017) analyze the pre-
mium of 1,880 U.S. municipal green bonds and discover that they are traded at a dis-
count of 7.8 bps during the period from 2010 to 2016 compared to their ordinary coun-
terparts, although the green bond premium exists from 2015 onward. They suggest that 
the result could be biased due to some unobservable factors such as the lack of aware-
ness or the skepticism of the market participants on green financing, which need to be 
explored further in future literature. In addition to that, Baker et al. (2018) argue that 
this result may be incorrect as many municipal green bonds in the U.S. market are taxa-
ble. Since investors’ income are more likely to be taxed, they often require higher yields 
when investing in bonds (Atwood, 2003).  
 
By using various methods of collecting and analyzing data, empirical studies present 
mixed evidence about the existence of green bond premiums in both primary and sec-
ondary markets. It leaves room for future research on this emerging field of study, espe-
cially in the tendency of rising concerns about climate change and green financing. Fo-
cusing on the secondary corporate green bond market, this thesis intends to examine 
the green bond premium further and to provide some insights about the determinants 





4 Data and methodology 
This chapter outlines the data selection process and the research methodology applied 
in the thesis. Specifically, the first sub-section explains the construction of the dataset. 
The second sub-section documents the empirical method used to examine the presence 





This thesis intends to examine all the corporate green bonds and their comparable ordi-
nary bonds listed on Bloomberg Terminal by February 28th, 2020. The preparation of the 
dataset starts by constructing a list of corporate green bonds. For that purpose, bonds 
whose Asset class named Corporates and the Use of proceeds described as Green 
bond/loan are selected. This list consists of 2,366 green bonds with various coupon types, 
different ratings from different industries and are denominated in a variety of currencies. 
 
In the next step, all the green bonds with floating coupon rates and zero-coupon bonds 
are removed because they are priced differently from fixed coupon bonds. The process 
continues with the Matching procedure. Each green bond is matched with a pair of ordi-
nary bonds from the same issuer based on the specific conditions, as presented in Table 
2. The goal of this method is to enhance the comparability between green bonds and 
ordinary bonds, thereby greatly reducing the effects of common unobservable factors 
and liquidity bias (Zerbib, 2019). Referring to Zerbib (2019) and Bachelet et al. (2019), 























Less than four times and greater than one-quarter of the 
corresponding green bond’s issued amount 
Maximum 0.25% higher or 0.25% lower than the corre-
sponding green bond’s coupon rate 
Maximum 2 years earlier or 2 years later than the corre-
sponding green bond’s maturity date 
Maximum 7 years earlier or 7 years later than the corre-









After eliminating all bonds that have incomplete data, bond-specific information and 
daily yields and prices from January 1st, 2016 to February 28th, 2020 are retrieved from 
Bloomberg Terminal and Thompson Reuters Eikon. For bond characteristics, the follow-
ing information is obtained: (1) International Securities Identification Number (ISIN); (2) 
Bloomberg Barclays Classification (BCLASS) level 2; (3) Issuer name; (4) Currency; (5) Ma-
turity date; (6) Issued amount in local currency; (7) Issued amount in USD; (8) Coupon 
frequency; (9) S&P Rating; (10) Moody’s Rating; (11) Collateral type; (12) Seniority; (13) 
Maturity type; (14) Coupon type.  
 
For daily bond yields and prices, the following data is downloaded: (1) Ask yield; (3) Bid 
price; (4) Ask price. Additional information about the external reviews or certifications 
of bonds is collected manually from the CBI database as well as from the corporate 
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website of the green bond issuers. As a result, the dataset consists of 44 bond triplets. 
After integrating time-series data, bonds with missing data are removed. Finally, the 
sample comprises 17,162 bond-day observations.  
 
 
4.2 Research methodology 
Several empirical studies on yield difference between various types of fixed-income se-
curities employ an OLS panel regression as the main research methodology. In particular, 
when examining the existence of the green bond premium, many researchers disentan-
gle yield spreads into bond characteristic components and the “greenness” feature de-
noted by a dummy variable. One striking advantage of this approach is its simplicity. It 
enables researchers to run panel regressions without conducting additional steps for 
data processing.  
 
However, this method has several drawbacks. Firstly, no consensus has been reached 
upon the main determinants of yield differential between green bonds and their con-
ventional counterparts. Moreover, there are no agreed theories to explain how bond-
specific factors or the “greenness” of bond could influence such a yield gap while the 
presence of the green bond premium is still an ongoing debate. Finally, the inclusion of 
the “green” dummy variable into an OLS specification could pose a multicollinearity 
problem. For example, green bonds typically require issuers to meet a high level of trans-
parency in reporting and communication, which could already be factored in the credit 
rating. 
 
To alleviate the problems posed by the above methodology, a large body of literature 
employ the model-free technique or the Matching method. To be specific, this method 
involves matching a pair of investment assets with the same characteristics except for 
one feature which is the leading property of interest. It appears to be the preferred 
methodology for recent research on the green bond premium thanks to several ad-
vantages over the classical panel regression.  Firstly, it mostly eliminates unobserved 
33 
 
effects emerging from bond structure differences between green bonds and conven-
tional bonds of the same issuer. Since most of the bond-specific factors driving bond 
yields are identical, the yield differential can be decomposed into two components: li-
quidity difference and green premium. Secondly, this technique could reduce the multi-
collinearity problem caused by the “green” dummy variable.  
 
From the above reasonings, this thesis employs the Matching method to examine the 
green bond premium. After matching green bonds with comparable conventional bonds, 
a panel regression analysis is conducted to decompose the yield difference of green 
bonds and matched ordinary ones into liquidity difference and green bond premium. 
Lastly, OLS cross-sectional regressions are run to address the main factors driving such a 
premium. The description of the variables and model specifications will be discussed in 
the following parts of this sub-section. 
 
The methodology applied in this study is strictly consistent with Zerbib (2019). Never-
theless, while developing on the mentioned research, this research takes into account 
the effect of external review or certification on the green bond premium. Furthermore, 
compared to Zerbib (2019) who explores the green bond market until December 31st, 
2017, this study provides more recent empirical evidence about green bond premium 
over a more extended period. 
 
 
4.2.1 Estimating the green bond premium 
The first stage of the analysis aims at investigating the presence of the green bond pre-
mium by capturing the unobserved effect driving the yield differential between green 
bonds and ordinary bonds. To reach that objective, liquidity control variable, maturity 
control and a variable to measure the above-mentioned differential are introduced. Af-
ter that, through a panel regression with fixed effects, the pricing gap between two kinds 
of bonds is disintegrated into a liquidity component and an unobserved factor indicating 




Maturity control:  
 
Due to the limitedness of the data, matching the maturity date between green and non-
green bonds cannot be done. Therefore, a maturity control is introduced to reduce the 
maturity bias. In order to do that, every two conventional bonds in a bond triplet are 
linearly interpolated or extrapolated at the corresponding green bond’s maturity date 
(Zerbib, 2019). By doing so, for each bond triplet, a synthetic ordinary bond is created 
with the same maturity as that of the green bond.  Practically, the following formula 
identifies the yield of the synthetic conventional bond: 
 𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝐶𝐵 = 𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝐶𝐵2 − 𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝐶𝐵1𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐶𝐵2 − 𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐶𝐵1 (𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐺𝐵 − 𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐶𝐵1) + 𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝐶𝐵1 
 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝐶𝐵 is the yield of the synthetic conventional bond. 𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝐶𝐵1 and 𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝐶𝐵2 
are the yield of conventional bond 1 and 2 in each bond triplet. 𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐺𝐵  , 𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐶𝐵1 and 𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐶𝐵2 are time to maturity of the green bond, conventional 
bond 1 and 2 in each matched bond set, respectively.  
 
Figures 4 and 5 illustrate the examples of the interpolation and extrapolation process. In 
Figure 4, the green bond has a yield of 1.742%, with 7.47 years to maturity. Conventional 
bond 1 and 2 are issued by the same issuer with the maturity of 7.36 and 7.87 years, 
respectively. The yields of those conventional bonds are 1.753% and 1.752%. By applying 
the above formula, a synthetic conventional bond is generated, with a yield of 1.7528% 
and a maturity of 7.47 years. For the bond set presented in Figure 5, the same computa-
tion is done to create a new synthetic conventional bond that has the same maturity as 






Figure 4. Example of linear interpolation of the yields of two conventional bonds at the 
maturity date of the corresponding green bond 
 
 
Figure 5. Example of linear extrapolation of the yields of two conventional bonds at the 
maturity date of the corresponding green bond 
 
Liquidity control:  
 
Many empirical studies find that liquidity factors could have an impact on yield differ-
ence between two types of corporate bonds (Chen et al., 2007; Dastidar & Phelps, 2011; 
Bao et al., 2011; Bongaerts et al., 2017). Although the Matching approach significantly 
reduces the liquidity bias, there is still liquidity difference because green and non-green 
bonds cannot be matched perfectly. For that reason, it is essential to control for the re-
sidual liquidity between green bonds and synthetic ordinary bonds. Previous literature 
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on green bond premium develops various proxies for liquidity control. For example, Bar-
clays (2015) uses the issuance date while Baker et al. (2018) employ the issue amount as 
a liquidity proxy.  
 
Zerbib (2019) verifies that after matching green bonds with comparable synthetic ones, 
the bid-ask spread is an appropriate proxy to limit liquidity and maturity bias. The author 
further argues that other proxies that require intraday yields or daily trading volume data 
cannot be used due to the availability of the data. Besides, Fong et al. (2017) suggest 
that the bid-ask spread is the most effective method to measure liquidity for low-fre-
quency bond data. Therefore, this paper uses bid-ask spread, which is the difference 
between the bid and ask price, as a liquidity control variable. Following Zerbib (2019), 
the bid-ask spread of the synthetic conventional bond is estimated as follows: 
 𝐵𝐴𝑖,𝑡𝐶𝐵 = 𝑑2𝑑1 + 𝑑2 𝐵𝐴𝑖,𝑡𝐶𝐵1 + 𝑑1𝑑1 + 𝑑2 𝐵𝐴𝑖,𝑡𝐶𝐵2 
 
where: 𝑑1 = |𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐺𝐵 − 𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐶𝐵1| 𝑑2 = |𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐺𝐵 − 𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐶𝐵2| 
 𝐵𝐴𝑖,𝑡𝐶𝐵1 and 𝐵𝐴𝑖,𝑡𝐶𝐵2 denote the bid-ask spread of conventional bond 1 and 2 in each bond 
triplet while 𝐵𝐴𝑖,𝑡𝐶𝐵 measures the bid-ask spread of the synthetic conventional bond. Ac-
cordingly, the liquidity control variable is calculated as: 
 ∆𝐵𝐴𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐵𝐴𝑖,𝑡𝐺𝐵 − 𝐵𝐴𝑖,𝑡𝐶𝐵 
 
with ∆𝐵𝐴𝑖,𝑡 denoting the difference in bid-ask spread of green bond i and its identical 






Because the objective of the analysis is to understand how investors would value green 
bonds differently from ordinary bonds, the difference in ask yield between a green bond 
and its corresponding synthetic non-green bond is used as the dependent variable. Fur-
thermore, ask yield is used in the available green bond pricing literature, namely Zerbib 
(2019), Bachelet et al. (2019). Therefore, applying the same approach would make it 
easier to compare the results with previous studies. The variable is calculated by the 
following formula: 
    ∆𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖,𝑡𝐺𝐵 − 𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖,𝑡𝐶𝐵 
 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖,𝑡𝐺𝐵 denotes the yield of green bond i on day t, 𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖,𝑡𝐶𝐵 is the yield of the 
synthetic conventional bond created from two non-green bonds corresponding to green 
bond i on day t. ∆𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖,𝑡 is the yield difference of green bond i and its identical synthetic 
conventional bond on day t. 
 
Consequently, hypothesis H1 in the thesis is tested with the following setting: 
 ∆𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1∆𝐵𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (1) 
 
where ∆𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖,𝑡 is the yield difference between green bond i and its identical synthetic 
conventional bond on day t. 𝛼𝑖 reflects the unobserved cross-sectional fixed effects in 
the panel regression. ∆𝐵𝐴𝑖,𝑡 is the difference in bid-ask spread of green bond i and its 
identical synthetic conventional bond on day t, with 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 being the error term. 
 
Following Zerbib (2019), the green bond premium (𝛼𝑖) is the unexplained bond-specific 
fixed effects in the model (1). When 𝛼𝑖 is statistically significantly negative, the green 
bond i is traded at a lower yield compared to its matched conventional bond after con-
trolling for liquidity difference. It indicates that investors pay a premium to acquire the 
green bond i over its identical non-green twin. Conversely, if 𝛼𝑖 is statistically significantly 
positive, the green bond i is valued lower than its conventional counterpart’s price. 
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4.2.2 Identifying the determinants of the green bond premium 
In the next stage of the analysis, to test hypothesis H2, a cross-sectional regression is 
conducted. The main characteristics of bonds and the green-bond verification from an 
external party are considered as potential drivers of green bond premium. Table 3 gives 
information on the definitions of the explanatory variables. Specifically, the econometric 
estimation is addressed as follows: 
 𝛼𝑖 𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 =    𝛽0 + 𝛽1log (𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖) + 𝛽2𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑒𝑤𝑖 +𝛾1′𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾2′ 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾4′𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑗 + 𝑢𝑖     
 (2) 
 
with 𝑢𝑖  being the error term. 
 
Table 3. Variables legend 















Bond’s S&P rating. In case S&P rating is unavailable, Moody’s rat-
ing is used and converted into S&P rating. The groups of ratings 
are AA, A, BBB, B, NR (non-rated). Scale variable which takes: 1 if 
rating is NR, 2 if rating is BBB, 3 if rating is A, 4 if rating is AA. One 
B-rated bond is excluded to avoid the artificially high R2 problem. 
Bloomberg classification level 2 (BCLASS Level 2) is used, which 
provides 3 categories namely Financial Institutions, Industrials 
and Utility. Scale variable which takes: 1 if sector is Financial In-
stitutions, 2 if sector is Industrial, 3 if sector is Utility. 
The currency of the bond at issuance, comprising AUD, CNY, EUR, 
HKD, INR, MYR, NOK, SEK, THB, TWD, USD. Scale variable which 
takes: 1 if currency is USD, 2 if currency is AUD, 3 if currency is 
CNY, 4 if currency is EUR, 5 if currency is SEK, 6 if currency is THB. 








the artificially high R2 problem. The definitions of these curren-
cies are presented in Appendix 1. 
Issued amount in USD as of February 28th, 2020. 
Bond’s time to maturity in years, as of February 28th, 2020. 
Dummy variable which takes 1 if the green bond receives a veri-
fication or review from an independent party, 0 otherwise. 
 
 
4.3 Descriptive statistics 
The final unbalanced panel dataset consists of 44 matched triplets of bonds with 17,162 
bond-day observations. Due to the strict Matching criteria between green bonds and 
their comparable ordinary bonds, the number of bonds tested is greatly reduced, result-
ing in a relatively small sample compared to that of the benchmarked research. However, 
several empirical studies using the Matching approach have similar sample sizes. For 
instance, Goldreich et al. (2005) examine the yield differential of 55 matched pairs of 
on-the-run and off-the-run US Treasury bonds while Kreander et al. (2005) analyze the 






Figure 6. Green bond distribution by sector, rating, currency and year of issuance. 
 
Figure 6 depicts the composition of the sample by sector, rating, currency denomination 
and year of green bond issuance. Per sector, the Financials contribute 59% to the total 
number of bonds, followed by the Industrial and Utility sectors with 29% and 11%, re-
spectively. When looking at the ratings of the bonds, a large proportion of non-rated 
bonds (36%) could be observed. This figure is expected since most of the bonds from 
Asia and Nordic countries are not rated by S&P and Moody’s. Besides, A- and AA-rated 
bonds account for nearly half of the entire sample. The composition of the sample by 
currency reflects the global pattern that Europe is the dominant green bond issuer, fol-
lowed by Asia and America. Finally, 95% of the green bonds are issued after 2015, con-






Table 4. Summary statistics of the sample categorized by sector and rating 
    
Obser-
vations  Mean   SD   Min   Max  
Financial Institutions 
     
A ∆Yield (%) 2,896 -0.031 0.094 -0.609 0.235 
 
∆BA (bps) 2,896 -0.088 0.185 -1.051 0.244 
 
Maturity of GB (years) 2,896 5.505 0.768 5.003 7.016 
 
Coupon rate of GB (%) 2,896 0.811 0.262 0.300 1.125 
AA ∆Yield (%) 3,614 0.035 0.559 -2.991 3.835 
 
∆BA (bps) 3,614 0.019 0.111 -0.453 0.630 
 
Maturity of GB (years) 3,614 5.225 0.668 5.003 7.005 
 
Coupon rate of GB (%) 3,614 1.414 1.445 0.250 3.625 
BBB ∆Yield (%) 989 0.024 0.104 -0.130 0.345 
 
∆BA (bps) 989 -0.031 0.077 -0.427 0.146 
 
Maturity of GB (years) 989 5.004 0.002 5.003 5.005 
 
Coupon rate of GB (%) 989 0.958 0.260 0.750 1.250 
NR ∆Yield (%) 2,110 -0.022 0.131 -1.711 1.981 
 
∆BA (bps) 2,110 -0.026 0.093 -0.801 0.251 
 
Maturity of GB (years) 2,110 4.146 1.069 3.003 5.003 
  Coupon rate of GB (%) 2,110 4.595 2.154 1.875 8.550 
Industrial 
     
AA ∆Yield (%) 1,206 -0.029 0.083 -0.455 0.364 
 
∆BA (bps) 1,206 -0.082 0.034 -0.204 0.002 
 
Maturity of GB (years) 1,206 8.505 2.121 7.005 10.005 
 
Coupon rate of GB (%) 1,206 2.925 0.106 2.850 3.000 
B ∆Yield (%) 366 0.790 1.841 -4.141 4.686 
 
∆BA (bps) 366 -0.020 0.032 -0.045 0.243 
 
Maturity of GB (years) 366 8.299 0.000 8.299 8.299 
 
Coupon rate of GB (%) 366 5.875 0.000 5.875 5.875 
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BBB ∆Yield (%) 1,317 -0.101 0.174 -0.970 0.648 
 
∆BA (bps) 1,317 -0.007 0.060 -0.506 0.089 
 
Maturity of GB (years) 1,317 5.003 0.000 5.003 5.003 
 
Coupon rate of GB (%) 1,317 2.875 0.000 2.875 2.875 
NR ∆Yield (%) 2,385 0.023 0.092 -0.525 0.335 
 
∆BA (bps) 2,385 0.160 3.305 -0.513 80.518 
 
Maturity of GB (years) 2,385 5.504 2.929 3.003 10.008 
  Coupon rate of GB (%) 2,385 2.564 1.185 0.950 3.860 
Utility 
     
A ∆Yield (%) 967 -0.049 0.113 -0.608 0.325 
 
∆BA (bps) 967 0.035 0.097 -0.284 0.475 
 
Maturity of GB (years) 967 8.505 2.121 7.005 10.005 
 
Coupon rate of GB (%) 967 1.858 1.389 0.875 2.840 
BBB ∆Yield (%) 1,220 0.001 0.109 -0.275 0.547 
 
∆BA (bps) 1,220 -0.064 0.088 -0.141 0.813 
 
Maturity of GB (years) 1,220 6.045 1.362 5.082 7.008 
 
Coupon rate of GB (%) 1,220 2.188 0.442 1.875 2.500 
NR ∆Yield (%) 92 0.005 0.043 -0.021 0.289 
 
∆BA (bps) 92 0.096 0.056 -0.277 0.106 
 
Maturity of GB (years) 92 5.723 0.000 5.723 5.723 
  Coupon rate of GB (%) 92 4.870 0.000 4.870 4.870 
Entire sample 
     
A ∆Yield (%) 3,863 -0.036 0.100 -0.609 0.325 
 
∆BA (bps) 3,863 -0.057 0.176 -1.051 0.475 
 
Maturity of GB (years) 3,863 6.172 1.660 5.003 10.005 
 
Coupon rate of GB (%) 3,863 1.043 0.711 0.300 2.840 
AA ∆Yield (%) 4,820 0.019 0.486 -2.991 3.835 
 
∆BA (bps) 4,820 -0.006 0.107 -0.453 0.630 
 
Maturity of GB (years) 4,820 5.822 1.602 5.003 10.005 
 
Coupon rate of GB (%) 4,820 1.689 1.430 0.250 3.625 
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B ∆Yield (%) 366 0.790 1.841 -4.141 4.686 
 
∆BA (bps) 366 -0.020 0.000 -0.045 0.243 
 
Maturity of GB (years) 366 8.299 0.000 8.299 8.299 
 
Coupon rate of GB (%) 366 5.875 0.000 5.875 5.875 
BBB ∆Yield (%) 3,526 -0.031 0.147 -0.970 0.648 
 
∆BA (bps) 3,526 -0.033 0.079 -0.506 0.813 
 
Maturity of GB (years) 3,526 5.301 0.753 5.003 7.008 
 
Coupon rate of GB (%) 3,526 1.857 0.917 0.750 2.875 
NR ∆Yield (%) 4,587 0.002 0.113 -1.711 1.981 
 
∆BA (bps) 4,587 0.073 2.386 -0.801 80.518 
 
Maturity of GB (years) 4,587 4.923 2.229 3.003 10.008 
  Coupon rate of GB (%) 4,587 3.597 1.911 0.950 8.550 
 
Table 4 reports the summary statistics of the sample. Overall, there is a considerable 
variation in yield differential (∆Yield) across different sectors and rating classes. For in-
stance, the average yield difference of BBB bonds in the Financial sector is 2.4 bps while 
bonds with similar rating in the Industrial sector has an average yield spread of roughly 
-10.1 bps. It means that Financial BBB-rated green bonds have lower prices in compari-
son with their conventional peers. On the contrary, Industrial BBB-rated green bonds 
are priced higher than their non-green counterparts. Also, the large standard deviations 
within some sub-classes indicate that investors have disparate views when evaluating 
green bonds. 
 
Besides, as displayed in Table 4, the residual liquidity measured by the difference in the 
bid-ask spread (∆BA) is relatively small, with the average values ranging from -0.06 bps 
to 0.07 bps. These figures imply that the Matching procedure significantly reduced the 
liquidity bias between green and non-green bonds. A large fluctuation within some sub-
categories could be observed through high standard deviations, once again highlighting 
the contradictory perspectives of the market about the pricing and the prospects of 




When looking at the maturity of the sub-samples, Financial green bonds are reported to 
have a lower maturity with an average of 5 years, while this number for Industrial and 
Utility green bonds is roughly 6.8 years. It could be seen that the maturity of green bonds 
changes vastly across different sectors and rating groups. Another component worth 
mentioning is the coupon rate. Similar to other indicators, the coupon rate also varies 
greatly, with a mean spanning from 0.811% to 5.875%. Since the sample used in this 
study is an unbalanced panel and the distribution of bonds by sector, rating, currency 
are different, no further conclusions on the relationship between the movement of the 
above indicators could be drawn.  
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5 Empirical results 
The empirical results presented in this chapter are organized into two parts. The first one 
concerns the evaluation of the sign and the magnitude of the green premium. The sec-
ond step is to assess the impact of bond-specific characteristics on such a premium. Ac-
cordingly, key findings are discussed and compared with empirical results from previous 
studies on the green bond premium. 
 
 
5.1 Green bond premium 
As stated in the previous chapter, to identify the presence of the green bond premium, 
panel regression with fixed effects is run on the following equation: 
 ∆𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1∆𝐵𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡   (1) 
 
Referring to Zerbib (2019), the green bond premium is defined as an unobserved bond-
specific and time-invariant effect. Therefore, 𝛼𝑖 in equation (1) is the green bond pre-
mium corresponding to each specific bond triplet. The panel regression is conducted on 
the assumption that errors are homoscedastic and have a zero mean value. The Durbin 
Watson statistic indicates that there is an autocorrelation detected in the residuals. The 
Breusch-Pagan test is run, reporting that the variance of the error terms remains con-
stant across observations. Furthermore, the results of the Normality test confirms that 
the residual values are not normally distributed. Lastly, unit root tests are conducted to 
check the stationarity of the residuals. Of which, a majority of the tests report that the 
residual series is stationary. The results of the above tests are presented in Appendix 2. 
 
Table 5 shows the outputs of the regression from equation (1). Accordingly, the R2 equals 
to 18.14%. The coefficient for the liquidity control variable (∆𝐵𝐴) is estimated to -0.8232 
and statistically significant at a 1% significance level. This figure indicates that a 1% in-
crease in residual liquidity (captured by the difference in bid-ask spread) between a 
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green bond and its identical synthetic conventional twin results in a 0.82% decrease in 
the yield spread between two mentioned types of bonds. Practically, the yield differen-
tial of a green bond and its identical non-green peer is negatively associated with the 
deteriorating liquidity of that green bond. 
 
Table 5. Identifying the green bond premium 
Dependent variable: ∆𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖,𝑡 








Adjusted R2 0.1793 
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.  
  
Next, a Hausman test is performed to compare the robustness of the fixed-effects and 
the random-effects models. The purpose of this step is to see which model is more ap-
propriate for testing hypothesis H1. The outcome suggests that a random-effects model 
should be run alternatively. Therefore, the author re-estimates specification (1) using a 
random-effects panel regression. The discrepancy between the two models is that the 
unobserved bond-specific effects are assumed not to be correlated with the control var-
iable in the random-effects model. 
 
As shown in Table 6, despite the extremely weak R2 (0.1%), the results confirm the sta-
tistically significant and negative association between the liquidity difference and yield 
differential of green bonds and their matched conventional twins. Following the regres-
sion, several robustness checks are performed to examine the heteroskedasticity, 
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autocorrelation, normality and stationary concerns. The outputs of those tests are pre-
sented in Appendix 3. 
 
Table 6. Results of the panel regression with random effects 








Adjusted R2 0.0007 
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.  
 
Furthermore, to observe how the above-discovered relationship evolves over time, year 
fixed effects are added into equation (1). Accordingly, the following estimation is consid-
ered: 
 ∆𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1∆𝐵𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡   (3) 
 
where 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 is a scale variable which denotes the year of the observation. 
 
The outcomes of the conducted regression for the above specification are displayed in 
Table 7. It is noted that a one-year increase in Year leads to an increase of 0.57 bps in the 
yield differential between two kinds of bonds (∆Yield). However, this result is not statis-
tically significant. On the other hand, liquidity difference (∆𝐵𝐴) is proved to have a neg-
ative influence on ∆Yield with a coefficient of -0.8223. It is statistically significant at a 1% 
level of confidence and closely consistent with the finding from the regression of model 
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(1). To check the robustness of the results, various robustness tests are performed, with 
the results shown in Appendix 4. 
 
Table 7. Regression results of model (3) 
Dependent variable: ∆𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖,𝑡 










Adjusted R2 0.1794 
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.  
 
Following Zerbib (2019), the green premium for each bond triplet in the sample can be 
documented by obtaining the fixed effects in the panel regression of equation (1), as 
presented in Appendix 5. The distribution of the estimated green bond premia is illus-
trated in Table 8 and Figure 7. A large fluctuation of green bond premia could be ob-
served, varying from -34.13 bps to 78.14 bps with a mean and median of -0.45 and -1.34 
bps, respectively. Remarkably, a total of 75% of the estimated green premia is negative, 
showing that compared to their non-green peers, most of the green bonds are over-






Table 8. Distribution of the estimated green bond premia 
Green bond premium: ?̂?𝑖 
Min 1st Quartile Median Mean 3rd Quartile Max 
-0.3413 -0.0457 -0.0134 -0.0045 -0.0010 0.7814 
 
 
Figure 7. Histogram of green bond premia distribution 
 
Subsequently, a sub-sample analysis is implemented to see the variations of the green 
bond premium across market segments, currencies and rating classes. In order to do so, 
as recommended by Zerbib (2019), the author performs Wilcoxon sign-rank tests for sub-
samples to evaluate whether ?̂?𝑖 is significantly different from 0. The results of the tests 
are presented in Table 9 below. In general, the green premium of the full sample is dif-
ferent from 0 at a 5% significance level with a mean of -0.45 bps, which confirms the 
presence of a negative green bond premium on an overall perspective. When looking 
into market segments, Financials are reported to have a -2.6 bps premium on average at 
a significance level of 5%. Meanwhile, the Industrial and Utility sectors with mean premia 





























When analyzing the green premia across different currencies and ratings, the figures are 
difficult to interpret. As shown in Table 9, CNY-denominated green bonds have a signifi-
cant average green premium of -9.4 bps. Surprisingly, EUR and USD-denominated green 
bonds do not show any statistically significant mean values. On the other hand, A-rated 
and non-rated green bonds are found to have a negative and statistically significant av-
erage premium. Table 9 documents an average premium of -5.24 and -3.23 for A-rated 
and non-rated green bonds, respectively. Meanwhile, AA-rated, BBB-rated and B-rated 
green bonds do not have any statistically significant mean of premium. Consequently, 
the analysis could not provide evidence on the impact of credit rating and currency de-
nomination on the green bond premium. 
 
Table 9. Sub-sample analysis of the green bond premium 
  Mean(?̂?𝑖)  Median(?̂?𝑖)  ?̂?𝑖 ≠ 0  No. GB  
Full sample -0.0045 -0.0134  **  44 
Sector 
    
Financial Institutions -0.0258 -0.0232 ** 26 
Industrial 0.0502 -0.0103 
 
13 
Utility -0.0361 -0.0079   5 
Currency 
    
AUD -0.0140 -0.0140 
 
2 
CNY -0.0945 -0.0048 ** 7 
EUR 0.0113 -0.0314 
 
18 
HKD -0.0079 -0.0079 
 
1 
INR 0.0012 0.0012 
 
1 
MYR -0.0027 -0.0027 
 
1 
NOK 0.2039 0.2039 
 
1 
SEK -0.0216 -0.0286 
 
3 
THB 0.0097 0.0097 
 
2 
TWD -0.0126 -0.0126 
 
1 




    
AA 0.0223 -0.0129 
 
11 
A -0.0524 -0.0426 * 9 
BBB -0.0338 -0.0464 
 
7 
B 0.7814 0.7814 
 
1 
NR -0.0323 -0.0047 ** 16 
Note: The Wilcoxon sign-rank tests are conducted to evaluate whether the mean 
green bond premium of the sub-samples is significantly different from 0. The null 
hypothesis H0: ?̂?𝑖 = 0 is rejected when the probability is lower than the certain level 
of significance. *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. 
 
 
5.2 Determinants of the green bond premium 
The thesis proceeds by investigating essential factors influencing the green bond pre-
mium discovered in the previous section. To do so, the cross-sectional regressions of the 
estimated green bond premium are run on various bond-specific characteristics. As men-
tioned earlier, to avoid the possibility of artificially high R2, the analysis eliminates groups 
(categorized by sector, credit rating, currency, year of issuance) in which less than two 
observations are available. As a result, the sample size is reduced to 38 observations. 
 
The cross-sectional regressions in this study are performed under the assumption that 
errors have a zero mean value and are homoscedastic. The Breusch-Pagan checks sup-
port the above assumption. Furthermore, the Normality tests report that the residual 
values are not normally distributed. Finally, to check the multicollinearity problem, the 
Variance Inflation Factors are obtained, which states that the explanatory variables are 
slightly correlated. The results of the tests could be found in Appendix 6. 
 
Table 10 presents six model specifications in line with equation (2) stated in the previous 
chapter. (a) regresses the green bond premium on four fundamental bond features: Rat-
ing, Sector, Issued Amount, Maturity. (b) the Maturity variable is replaced by the External 
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Review dummy variable. (c) includes the Currency dummy and drops the External Review 
variable. (d) further comprises the External Review dummy. (e) drops the Rating dummy. 
(f) excludes the Currency dummy and considers the effect of the Rating × External Re-
view variable. Across all the specifications, it is reported that R2 varies from 8.89% to 
23.98%. The low R2 is expected since the recent emergence of the corporate green bond 
market restricts the number of observations, and hence the explanatory power of the 
models. 
 
Across all variants of the regression, neither maturity nor sector has a statistically signif-
icant influence on the green bond premium. Similarly, when being considered in model 
(c) and (d), the currency seems not to have any statistically significant correlation with 
the green bond premium. On the contrary, the green bond’s issue amount is negatively 
associated with the green bond premium. This pattern is consistent and significant 
across model (a), (b) and (f). Specifically, in model (a) and (b), the coefficient of the log(Is-
sued Amount) variable is  -0.06 at a 10% significance degree. Meanwhile, this figure in 
model (f) is -0.05 at a 5% significance level.  
 
Besides, the rating factor appears to have a statistically negative impact on the green 
bond premium when being embedded into model (a), (b), (c) and (d). Specifically, across 
four models, the coefficients for the Rating dummy span from 0.05 to 0.06 and are sig-
nificant at least at a 10% level. Lastly, the external review cannot derive any statistically 
significant influence on the green bond premium in model (b), (d) and (e).  
 
As stated earlier, external reviews provide additional information about the credibility of 
green bonds. Meanwhile, the credit rating of a bond represents its creditworthiness. 
Therefore, in model (f), the interaction variable Rating × External Review is included to 
assess the joint effect of external review and rating on the green bond premium. The 
regression outcome shows that Rating × External Review positively impacts the green 




Table 10. Determinants of the green bond premium 
   Dependent variable: ?̂?𝑖 
  (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) 
Constant 0.9530* 0.8581 0.5489 0.6101 0.2489 0.8704* 
 
(0.5300) (0.5172) (0.5748) (0.5876) (0.5834) (0.4703) 
Rating 0.0474* 0.0485* 0.0556** 0.0526*  
 
 
(0.0275) (0.0259) (0.0258) (0.0264)  
 
Sector -0.0126 0.0094 0.0121 0.0154 -0.0006 0.0098 
 
(0.0456) (0.0418) (0.0418) (0.0424) (0.0435) (0.0441) 
Currency 
  
0.0289 0.0214 0.0132 
 
   
(0.0207) (0.0239) (0.0245) 
 
log(Issued 
Amount) -0.0578* -0.0551* -0.0424 -0.0459 -0.0194 -0.0524** 
 
(0.0288) (0.0275) (0.0287) (0.0294) (0.0274) (0.0248) 
Maturity 0.0140 

















Rating ×  Exter-
nal Review 
    
 0.0537*** 
     
 (0.0192) 
Observations 38 38 38 38 38 38 
R2 0.1376 0.1688 0.1786 0.1892 0.0889 0.2398 
Adjusted R2 0.0331 0.0681 0.0791 0.0625 -0.0216 0.1476 
F-Statistic 1.3164 1.6754 1.7944 1.4937 0.8048 2.6018 
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  




5.3 Results interpretations and discussion 
The conducted empirical analysis documents a small green bond premium of -0.45 bps, 
meaning that on average, investors are willing to sacrifice 0.45 bps of yield to invest in 
green bonds over comparable non-green bonds. Consequently, the study supports hy-
pothesis H1, confirming that corporate green bonds are traded with a lower yield than 
their identical conventional counterparts. Although the estimated green bond premium 
is small, it highlights the investors’ interests in green bonds. This outcome is in line with 
previous studies on green bond premium in the secondary market (Barclays, 2015; 
Zerbib, 2019; Partridge & Medda, 2020). To a broader extent, this result underscores the 
view that the taste for certain types of assets could drive investment decisions (Fama & 
French, 2007). The findings can also be related to the Economic Theories of Social Norms 
which proposes that investors might accept an extra cost to mitigate the risks associated 
with the violation of social norms (Elster, 1989).  
 
Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that not all green bonds are priced higher than their con-
ventional twins. In fact, a total of 25% of the discovered green premia is positive, mean-
ing that these green bonds exhibit higher yields than their non-green peers. The out-
come implies that at some points, green bonds are considered cheaper than their iden-
tical ordinary counterparts. Therefore, although the study identifies a small negative 
green premium, the finding does not contradict CBI (2018) which finds that investors 
have opposing perspectives when evaluating green bonds. Since the green bond market 
is still immature and regulations are being developed, the pricing of green bonds is an 
ongoing challenge for the market participants. 
 
The liquidity difference captured by the bid-ask spread (∆𝐵𝐴) is demonstrated to have 
an adverse relationship with the yield differential between green bonds and their con-
ventional peers. To be specific, a 1% increase in ∆𝐵𝐴 leads to a 0.82% decline in the yield 
spread between two varieties of bonds. This result supplements the findings from Bao 
et al., (2011), Howeling et al. (2005), which argue that liquidity difference has an influ-




The second part of the analysis aims to test hypothesis H2 by providing evidence on the 
drivers of the estimated green bond premium. An important outcome from the study is 
that the issue amount of green bond and the green premium are negatively correlated. 
Particularly, a 1% increase in the issue amount of the green bond results in a range be-
tween 0.05 to 0.06 bps decrease in green bond premium. This co-movement is con-
sistent with empirical findings from Karpf and Mandel (2017), Bachelet et al. (2019), fig-
uring out the negative linkage between green bond premium and the principal amount 
of the green bond issuance.  
 
Consistently with the existing research on the green bond premium, the sector does not 
seem to have a substantial impact on the variation of the green bond premium. However, 
a sub-sample test confirms that the Financial industry exhibits a green premium of -2.6 
bps on average, considerably higher than that of the entire sample (-0.45 bps). As spec-
ulated by Zerbib (2019), financial green bonds have a significant negative premium on 
average because the Financials are the most active issuers on the corporate green bond 
market. Also, the Financial sector can attract considerable financial resources for the im-
plementation of green or climate-related projects (Bachelet et al., 2019). 
 
Similar to prior studies, the inclusion of the currency dummy into the regression does 
not display any significant effect on the variation of the green bond premium. However, 
when breaking down the green bond premia by sub-samples of currencies, it is noticea-
ble that the CNY-denominated green bonds have an average premium of -9.45 bps. This 
figure is far higher than the mean of the entire sample, implying the interest of the in-
vestors in the Chinese green bond market, where has witnessed substantial growth in 
recent years with the construction of many large green infrastructures.  
 
In contradiction of Karpf and Mandel (2017), Zerbib (2019), Li et al. (2019), who point 
out that green bonds with higher credit ratings have lower premia, this study reports 
that a 1-level increase in bond rating leads to an approximately 5 bps increase in green 
56 
 
bond premium. Besides, the sub-sample tests document the negative and statistically 
significant mean of premium for the A-rated and non-rated categories of bonds. To be 
precise, the average premia of A-rated and non-rated green bonds are -5.24 bps and -
3.23 bps, respectively.  
 
When investigating the cross effect of rating and external review on the green bond pre-
mium, it is noted that non-rated bonds with external review have a higher premium of 
5.37 bps compared to non-rated bonds without external review. This figure goes up by 
5.37 bps when there is a 1-scale increase in the rating of certified green bonds. It signals 
that higher rated green bonds exhibit lower premia. This study could not interpret a log-
ical relationship between credit rating and the green bond premium from those out-
comes. However, the author suspects that the observed effects arise from the fact that 
7 out of 12 examined non-rated green bonds are denominated in CNY, the category 
whose average premium is previously shown to be significant and negative. 
 
Additionally, this study observes no statistically significant difference in green premium 
between green bonds with and without verification from a third party. This finding is 
inconsistent with existing research underlining the importance of third-party verification 
of green bonds (Bachelet et al.,2019; Li et al., 2019). A possible reason behind this con-
tradiction is the discrepancy in the green bond database selection. Bachelet et al. ob-
serve the CBI-aligned green bond listed on the Climate Bond Initiative database while Li 
et al. (2019) focus on the Chinese green bond market. Meanwhile, all green bonds listed 
on the Bloomberg Terminal are aligned with the Green Bond Principles (GBP) which al-
ready require the integrity, transparency and accuracy in reporting and communication 
among green bond issuers and investors. Therefore, it is suspected that the importance 





Rising concerns about the sustainable development of the business sector have paved 
the way for the growth of innovative means of financing. In that tendency, the substan-
tial evolution of green bonds has gained much attention from the financial market par-
ticipants. The empirical analysis of the field of Green Bond could be related to SRI and 
CSR studies. Earlier research states that good CSR practices would help firms improve 
their financial performance to some extent and reduce environmental or climate-related 
risks. The green bond issuance is also a channel for the communication between corpo-
rates and their investors about environmental affairs. Considering the potential ad-
vantages of green bonds, both bond and equity investors are found to appreciate this 
novel financial instrument. However, existing empirical evidence is insufficient to make 
a sound conclusion about the impact of green bonds on firms’ financial position.  
 
This thesis extends previous research by focusing on the corporate sector. At the time of 
writing this study, to the best knowledge of the author, there is no published empirical 
research examining the valuation of green bonds solely in the corporate green bond mar-
ket. The primary goal of this thesis is to investigate the pricing of green bonds through a 
comparison with their identical conventional peers. As stated in the previous chapters, 
the Matching method is employed to select the most appropriate pairs of green and non-
green bonds for the empirical analysis. This approach minimizes the effects of liquidity 
bias and the maturity difference between two types of bonds. By adopting the Matching 
method and analyzing the dataset of corporate green bonds derived from the Bloomberg 
Terminal, the results of the thesis would be of added value to the ongoing academic 
debate on the presence of the green bond premium. 
 
This study contributes to a better understanding of green bonds by documenting a small 
negative premium of 0.45 basis points, representing the existence of a green bond pre-
mium in the secondary corporate bond market. Additional tests for sub-samples reveal 
that Financial green bonds, CNY-denominated, A-rated and non-rated green bonds ex-
hibit a significant and negative average of premium. These results confirm that not all 
58 
 
bond investors value green bonds at a premium compared to non-green bonds. Since 
this type of securities has just recently introduced, the market could misprice or have a 
conservative view about the prospects of green bonds. Further exploration of the esti-
mated green bond premia reveals the negative association between the issued amount 
of green bonds and the green premium. Besides, the role of external assurance of the 
“greenness” towards the pricing for green bonds could not be witnessed from the em-
pirical outcomes. Future studies would be needed to identify the key drivers of the green 
bond premium. 
 
The thesis has numerous implications for corporate issuers and bond investors. Firstly, 
the presence of a small negative green premium signals the investors’ pro-environmental 
preferences as well as the oversubscription of green bonds. Although there is no clear 
evidence that green bonds are a cheaper source of financing compared to conventional 
bonds, corporates could still benefit from attracting bond investors who are interested 
in environmental-related financial assets. Therefore, green bond issuance enables cor-
porates to expand their investor base as proposed by Shishlov et al. (2016) and Zerbib 
(2019). From the investor’s perspective, it appears that the extra cost incurred when 
choosing to invest in green securities over the normal ones, or the switching cost, is rel-
atively small. Combining with the fact that credible green bonds usually come along with 
enhanced transparency and additional information provided by the issuers, the green 
bond could be an attractive investment option. 
 
This thesis, however, is subject to several limitations. A major limitation of this study 
originates from the data availability. Focusing solely on the corporate green bond market 
segment confines the number of green bonds eligible for this thesis. The small sample 
size and the omission of undiscovered factors could lead to the inaccurate and insignifi-
cant regression results. Besides, the sample is not heterogeneous enough, potentially 
causing the biased generalization. Furthermore, considering that the corporate green 
bond market has recently emerged, the findings of the green bond premium are 
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provisional. Therefore, it is necessary to conduct the same analysis at a later point of 
time when the market matures and the quality of the data is enhanced. 
 
Another limit of this thesis could be attributed to the use of ask yield, or ask yield to 
maturity, as a measure for valuation since the author attempts to understand how inves-
tors price green bonds. The underlying assumption that bonds are held until maturity is 
not realistic since bond investors do not always hold bonds until maturity. Thus, it would 
be interesting to identify a more effective metric to capture the pricing discrepancy be-
tween green bonds and their identical non-green peers. Finally, the use of the Bloomberg 
green bond database substantially limits the number of observations because green-la-
beled bonds that are not aligned with the GBP are eliminated. Building on this research, 
comparing the performance of green bonds complied with different voluntary guidelines 
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Appendix 1. Acronyms of the currencies 
  ID           Currency 
AUD Australian Dollar 
CNY Chinese Yuan 
EUR Euro 
HKD Hong Kong Dollar 
INR Indian Rupee 
MYR Malaysian Ringgit 
NOK Norwegian Krone 
SEK Swedish Krona 
THB Thai Baht 
TWD Taiwan Dollar 





Appendix 2. Robustness test results of model (1) with fixed-effects panel 
regression 
  ∆𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1∆𝐵𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
  Test Statistic 
P-
value Conclusion 
Serial correlation Durbin-Watson 0.509 
 
Serial correlation 
Normality Jarque-Bera 1822994 0.000 Non-normality 
Heteroskedasticity Breusch-Pagan 0.986 0.321 Homoskedasticity 
Unit root test Levin, Lin & Chu -26.537 0.000 Stationarity 
Unit root test Im, Pesaran & 
Shin 
-36.296 0.000 Stationarity 
Unit root test ADF-Fisher 1418.48 0.000 Stationarity 
Unit root test PP-Fisher 2638.60 0.000 Stationarity 





Appendix 3. Robustness test results of model (1) with random-effects 
panel regression 
  ∆𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1∆𝐵𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
  Test Statistic P-value Conclusion 
Serial correlation Durbin-Watson 0.417 
 
Serial correlation 
Normality Jarque-Bera 2470139 0.000 Non-normality 
Heteroskedasticity Breusch-Pagan 0.986 0.321 Homoskedasticity 
Unit root test Levin, Lin & Chu -26.534 0.000 Stationarity 
Unit root test Im, Pesaran & Shin -36.295 0.000 Stationarity 
Unit root test ADF-Fisher 1418.40 0.000 Stationarity 





Appendix 4. Robustness test results of model (3) 
  ∆𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1∆𝐵𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
  Test Statistic P-value Conclusion 
Serial correlation Durbin-Watson 0.509 
 
Serial correlation 
Normality Jarque-Bera 1829074 0.000 Non-normality 
Heteroskedasticity Breusch-Pagan 36.387 0.000 Heteroskedasticity 
Unit root test Levin, Lin & Chu -25.843 0.000 Stationarity 
Unit root test Im, Pesaran & Shin -35.290 0.000 Stationarity 
Unit root test ADF-Fisher 1373.98 0.000 Stationarity 





Appendix 5. Cross-sectional specific green bond premium 
Issuer ISIN Premium 
Covanta Holding Corp US22282EAG70 0.7814 
DZ Bank AG Deutsche Zentral-
Genossenschaftsbank Frankfurt Am Main DE000DDA0NB1 0.7206 
Vasakronan AB NO0010815202 0.2039 
Commerzbank AG DE000CZ40NG4 0.1284 
ABN AMRO Bank NV XS1808739459 0.0854 
National Australia Bank Ltd XS1872032369 0.0457 
BTS Group Holdings PCL TH0221039504 0.0334 
KBC Group NV BE0002602804 0.0225 
Southern Power Co US843646AT75 0.0080 
Bank of Qingdao Co Ltd CND10000G4D6 0.0014 
Bajaj Finance Ltd INE296A07LL7 0.0012 
Westpac Banking Corp XS1722859532 -0.0017 
Cypark Ref Sdn Bhd MYBVJ1901961 -0.0027 
Jiangsu Guoxin Investment Group Ltd CND10001ZNB5 -0.0031 
Bank of Gansu Co Ltd CND10000HFT3 -0.0040 
Vasakronan AB SE0007666136 -0.0046 
China Jushi Co Ltd CND10002DYF8 -0.0048 
HKCG Finance Ltd HK0000375300 -0.0079 
Commonwealth Bank of Australia AU3CB0243657 -0.0111 
Apple Inc US037833CX61 -0.0121 
Far Eastern New Century Corp TW000B501576 -0.0126 
OP Corporate Bank plc XS1956022716 -0.0129 
BTS Group Holdings PCL TH0221032509 -0.0139 
Westpac Banking Corp AU3CB0237683 -0.0169 
Swedbank AB XS1711933033 -0.0224 
ING Bank NV XS1324217733 -0.0240 
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Castellum AB SE0009161615 -0.0286 
Vasakronan AB SE0010830893 -0.0317 
Svenska Handelsbanken AB XS1848875172 -0.0389 
BNP Paribas SA XS1808338542 -0.0426 
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB XS1567475303 -0.0433 
Bank of Nanjing Co Ltd CND10000H8W6 -0.0435 
EDP Finance BV XS1893621026 -0.0454 
Intesa Sanpaolo SpA XS1636000561 -0.0464 
Intesa Sanpaolo SpA XS2089368596 -0.0611 
Apple Inc US037833BU32 -0.0633 
Hyundai Capital Services Inc USY3815NAV39 -0.1098 
Hyundai Capital Services Inc US44920UAG31 -0.1101 
Credit Agricole SA/London FR0013385515 -0.1254 
Engie SA FR0013245859 -0.1327 
BNP Paribas SA FR0013405537 -0.2033 
Bank of Communications Co Ltd CND10000F3H0 -0.2949 
Hebei Financial Leasing Co Ltd CND10000J0M2 -0.3127 





Appendix 6. Robustness test results of model (2) 
     Dependent variable: ?̂?𝑖 
    (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) 
Homoskedasticity 
     
 
 
Breusch-Pagan P-value 0.4108 0.4803 0.5004 0.6613 0.9037 0.6058 
Normality 
     
 
 
Jarque-Bera P-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Multicollinearity VIF            
Rating 
 




1.3018 1.1323 1.1452 1.1617 1.1200 1.3775 
Currency 
   

















Rating ×  External 
Review            1.5079 
Note: Rating × External Review are slightly correlated, with a coefficient of 0.2 
 
Correlation matrix of Rating and External Review variables 
 
  Rating External Review 
Rating 1.0000 0.2025 
External Review 0.2025 1.0000 
 
 
 
 
 
